does not specify political corruption as a target of its proscription. Rather, it uses general terms to prohibit "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." These words, the subject of extensive judicial construction, 6 have provided the statutory basis for punishing certain forms of fraudulent public conduct.
Outside of the arena of political corruption, the mail fraud statute has been applied in schemes in which the victim of the fraud has transferred something of economic value to the defendant. 7 Beginning with United States v. States 8 in 1973, three circuits-the Fourth, 9 Seventh, 10 and Eighth"'-have applied section 1341 to situations in which corrupt politicians did not deprive the citizens of anything of economic value. Their crime was said to consist of defrauding citizens of their rights to honest government. That an official may now be convicted under section 1341 when his purported scheme to defraud has as its sole object the intangible and abstract political and civil rights of the general citizenry is perhaps the most important development in the history of the mail fraud statute. 12 In reaching their decisions, these courts have relied tions, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, or any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976 on the broad language of section 1341,13 prior Supreme Court decisions,' 14 and other case law construing section 1341.15 This comment addresses the question whether section 1341 properly reaches political corruption depriving citizens of their intangible rights to honest government. First, it reviews the schemes that have been held illegal under section 1341 in political-corruption cases. The comment then analyzes the statute, the legislative history, the meaning of "fraud" in the nineteenth century, and the prior case law, and concludes that section 1341 should not be read to extend to political-corruption cases.
I. FRAUDULENT SCHEMES INVOLVING CITIZENS' INTANGIBLE RIGHTS

United States v. Isaacs"" and United States v. Mandel 17 ius-
trate the type of scheme involved in the intangible-rights cases. In Isaacs, the former governor of Illinois, Otto Kerner, and his close political associate, Theodore Isaacs, had been convicted under section 1341 of using the mails to defraud "the State of Illinois and its citizens of the honest and faithful services of Kerner as governor." ' 18 The receipt of bribes provided the factual basis for the prosecution's theory of fraud. 1 9 Kerner, acting through Isaacs, arranged to purchase race track stock at below-market prices from the wealthy owner of Chicago-area racing interests, in return for his agreement to promote those interests before the state racing board and the state legislature. Although both Kerner and Isaacs made substantial monetary gains on their receipt of the stock, 20 there was no direct monetary loss by the state on the transaction. Indeed, state revenues from horse racing actually increased during Cir. 1979 ). The jury convicted Mandel in 1977. The court of appeals affirmed with respect to the theory of the crime, but remanded on account of trial error. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979). In a rehearing en banc, a majority of the court upheld the ruling of the trial court as to the theory of the crime, and an equally divided court affirmed the district court on the question of trial error, and so reinstated the conviction. 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 Ct. (1980 [47:562 the period in which Kerner was promoting the interests of the person from whom he had purchased the stock. 2 1 The defendants' enrichment came directly from the person who gave them the putative bribe-a person who was neither deceived nor defrauded. 22 For whatever reasons, Illinois authorities chose not to bring state charges for receiving bribes. Instead, the federal authorities-relying on the fact that Isaacs and Kerner made several mailings in connection with the scheme 2 3 -brought charges of mail fraud. To make the conduct involved fit within any arguable concept of fraud, the federal authorities had to turn to the intangible-rights theory.
The citizens of Illinois were the only persons even conceivably deceived or defrauded by the governor's conduct. 24 Since they relinquished nothing of economic value, it was only by asserting that they had been deprived of certain intangible political rights that they could be called victims of any fraudulent scheme.
In United States v. Mandel, 25 the defendant, Marvin Mandel, former governor of Maryland, had been convicted-along with his codefendants-under section 1341 of devising a scheme "to defraud the citizens of the State of Maryland and her governmental departments, agencies, officials and employees. . . of the right to conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and honest government through bribery and non-disclosure and concealment of material information." 26 Like Kerner, Mandel became the subject of federal 21 Id.
22
The race track owner who advanced the bribes, Marjorie L. Everett, was named as an unindicted coconspirator for her role in the transaction and served as a principal witness for the prosecution at the trial. Id. at 1131-32. 23 For example, Isaacs and Kerner devised the pretext of a fictitious loan to make it appear as if they had purchased the stock in question four years before they really obtained it. Under this pretext, the gain they made on the stock transaction would not have appeared so abrupt and obvious. To complete the fiction, "interest" was paid on this loan, and Kerner mailed a fictitious Internal Revenue Service form to the supposed lender to notify her that she had been reported as receiving this "interest." This mailing provided the basis of one of the mail fraud counts in the indictment. Id. at 1137.
2 Id. The defendants were also convicted of "defrauding the racing associations of Illinois of the right to obtain racing dates free from corruption and bribery." Id. at 1149. But it appeared from the record that no competitor of the racing interests lost racing dates" as a result of the scheme. Id. at 1139.
- 
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criminal prosecution in connection with an alleged scheme to promote race track interests.1 7 In 1972, Governor Mandel had supported certain race track legislation then in a critical stage of enactment before the Maryland General Assembly. The legislation became law, and it then became known that the law favored the interests of a group of race track investors that included friends and business associates of the governor-some of whom had given valuable personal property as well as business interests to Mandel. 25 Although Mandel denied having knowledge that the legislation would favor this group, the court of appeals held that his conduct amounted to either bribery or concealment of material information and thereby constituted a violation of section 1341.29 As in Isaacs, Mandel's actual enrichment was not derived directly from anyone Mandel even arguably defrauded or deceived. It was, therefore, necessary to resort to what amounts to a constructive theory of fraud, by finding that Mandel's alleged involvement in bribery and nondisclosure of material facts fraudulently deprived citizens of their right to honest government.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
Section 1341 prohibits "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 0 Whether this provision proscribes schemes to deprive citizens of their intangible rights as well as schemes "for obtaining money or property" depends on the meaning of "any scheme or artifice to defraud." Both the legislative history" and the meaning of the word "fraud" in the nineteenth century 3 2 indicate that the statute only reaches schemes that have as their goal the transfer of something of economic value to the defendant. 3 3 ' The circumstances in Mandel were far more subtle than those in Isaacs. Unlike the situation in Isaacs, all the principals in the alleged fraudulent scheme in Mandel were prosecuted, and the case against them consisted of indirect evidence. As the court of appeals stated, "It is... apparent that the case could not have been submitted on the theory that Governor Mandel had a direct interest in the race track business, for no direct connection on his part was either alleged or proven." Id. at 1364. The postal legislation, of which the mail fraud statute constituted a part, was in large part the work of a commission appointed under congressional authority to revise and consolidate the postal laws, 7 and of a committee of postal officials which then revised the Postal Code proposed by the commission . 3 The Postal Code prepared by the commission did not mention "schemes to defraud." The committee of postal officials, noting this omission and concerned that contemporaneous law did not adequately protect citizens from frauds conducted through the mails, added a section to the Code so that "power [might] be given to the officers of the [post office] department to prevent the operation of lottery gamblers through the postal service." 8 Congress adopted the substance of this recommendation in section 14940 of the Act of 1872, and also enacted two other sections dealing with fraud, section 30041 and section 301,2 the latter being the predecessor of the current section 1341.
The rationale for the enactment of section 301 was essentially the same as that for other antifraud provisions of the 1872 Act. The committee of postal officials, as indicated before, predicated their recommendation for new fraud legislation on the need "to prevent the frauds which are perpetrated by lottery swindlers Section 301 reached the principals, not just those who did the mailing, in schemes described in section 149.48 It did not prohibit or restrict only fraudulent schemes involving money, as did the literal words of section 149, but was phrased in more general language to proscribe "any scheme or artifice to defraud." Congressman Farnsworth of Illinois, House sponsor of the recodification legislation, explained that sections 300 and 301 were needed "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . .by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purposes of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country. '47 This background suggests that Congress in the fraud legislation of 1872 did not use the term "fraud" in some new and technical way, but rather intended to prohibit schemes that were within the conventional usage of the term and involved use of the federal mails. There is, moreover, no suggestion that Representative Farnsworth intended to proscribe any form of trickery or deception other than schemes to acquire the property of others.
2. The 1889 Amendment. In 1889, Congress amended the mail fraud statute by adding specific prohibitions against schemes dealing in "green articles," "green coin," "bills,". "paper goods," "spurious Treasury notes," "United States goods," or "green ci- The history of the amending legislation indicates that these terms were added at the request of postal authorities, who felt that the amendment was needed to reach certain counterfeiting schemes then prevalent. 4 This amending legislation demonstrates that the original prohibition of "any scheme or artifice to defraud" was never intended to operate as a broad prohibition of all schemes to deceive. If it had been so intended, it would not have been necessary to amend the statute to reach counterfeiting schemes. The amending legislation is also important in that Congress used specific, rather than general, language to reach such schemes. A statute amended in such piecemeal fashion cannot be authority for a doctrine as expansive as that of intangible rights.
3. The 1909 Amendment. In 1909, in the course of a general revision of the federal penal code, Congress amended the mail fraud statute by adding after the original prohibition of "any scheme or artifice to defraud" the words "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. ' 50 Although this amendment is of critical importance in determining whether the mail fraud statute only reaches schemes "for obtaining money or property," the enacting Congress apparently regarded this as an unimportant modification. Congress did not even require an explanation of the change from the sponsor of the amending legislation during the course of floor debates. 5 1 The courts applying section 1341 in intangible-rights cases have relied on the original prohibition of "any scheme . . . to defraud." They have treated that language as independent of, and broader than, the clause added in 1909.52 These courts thus interpret the statute as proscribing two types of conduct: "schemes... No. 10, PT. 2, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 238-40 (1908). Only one of these other amendments has any relevance to this inquiry. This amendment added schemes dealing in "green goods" to the list of prohibitions originally set out in 1889, see text at note 48 supra.
"' See, e.g., 42 CONG. REC. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn). In explaining the recodified and amended mail fraud statute, Senator Heyburn, the sponsor of the legislation, dealt with one change in the law affecting mailings made from outside the United States, noting: "I do not think there is any other change, which is not obvious upon the face of the bill, that needs any further explanation." Id. to defraud" or schemes "for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."
In United States v. States, 5 3 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the 1872 phrase and the 1909 phrase should be read "independently, rather than complementary of one another. ' 54 That is, the original expression "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud" should be read as entirely independent of the later expression "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," as if the two phrases were merely "part of an uninterrupted listing of a series of obviously diverse schemes." 5 5 According to such a reading, "any scheme or artifice to defraud" would not be modified by "for obtaining money or property." In this form, the court concluded, the original 1872 language would support a theory in which the obtaining of money or property plays no essential role. This construction of the statute should be rejected, however, since the courts that adopted it did not consider the import of a crucial piece of legislative history.
The 1909 amendment was enacted without comment or debate because it merely codified the prior Supreme Court decision of Durland v. United States. 6 In Durtand, the Court interpreted the mail fraud statute for the first time and held inapplicable a particular common-law defense. In most jurisdictions, one could not be convicted of the crime of obtaining money or property by false pretenses if he had merely made false promises. The Supreme Court held that this defense did not apply to the federal crime of mail fraud. The key language of that decision-"some schemes may be promoted through mere representations and promises as to the future, yet are nonetheless schemes and artifices to defraud" 5 7 -reappears in the language of the amendment: "representations, or promises." This change in the statute was submitted by a special commission to Congress in a modified criminal code, and the com- mission cited Durland in the margin of its report next to the revised mail fraud statute." Thus, the 1909 amendment was designed to expand narrowly the crime of mail fraud by removing one particular common-law defense. 59 Reading "any scheme . . .to defraud" independently of "for obtaining money or property" strips the 1909 language of any meaning. 6 0 If the 1909 amendment merely lists a new and separate crime concerned with "obtaining money and property," as the Eighth Circuit suggested, then the amendment was unnecessary. The mail fraud statute had been used to prosecute crimes against property well before 1909.1 Moreover, reading the two phrases independently defeats Congress's aim of codifying Durland; the common-law defense, under such a reading, would be available when the defendant is prosecuted for schemes to defraud rather than for schemes to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses. If, on the other hand, one treats the insertion of the phrase "for obtaining money or property" as merely promises" apply to all schemes to defraud, and Durland was codified. Once the 1909 amendment is seen as the codification of Durland, that amendment is necessarily inconsistent with the intangible-rights theory: Congress codified Durland's interpretation of "any scheme or artifice to defraud" as applicable only to crimes against property. Subsequent amendments to section 1341 have not affected its substance.
6 2 The intangible-rights theory is predicated on statutory language originally drafted in 1872 and last significantly amended in 1909. Analysis of the legislative history from this period indicates that Congress intended the statute to proscribe certain crimes against property. This construction receives additional support from the meaning of the word "fraud" at the time Congress prohibited "any scheme or artifice to defraud."
B. The Meaning of Fraud in the Nineteenth Century
In the nineteenth century, the term fraud referred to a wide variety of crimes. 0e Most frauds were prohibited by statute, but some were proscribed only by the common law." Many of those frauds prohibited by the common law in America were ones originally prohibited by English statutes. 6 5 Even with respect to the frauds prohibited only by statute, courts developed so-called common-law principles of fraud as glosses upon the statutes. 6 62 In 1948, certain colorful words used to describe fraudulent schemes were removed. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763. The House Report accompanying the amending legislation noted that this change was made to delete "the obsolete argot of the underworld" and that it, together with the elimination of other language considered to be "surplusage," was effected "without change of meaning" in the statute. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 85, at 627 (1972). 65 One English statute, old enough to be part of the common law in all American jurisdictions having common-law crimes, prohibited obtaining property by means of a "false token or counterfeit letter made in any other Man's Name." 33 Hen. 8, c. 
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Intangible-Rights Doctrine
Although courts have refused to define fraud, 6 7 crimes of fraud have generally been regarded as crimes against property involving some form of trickery or deception. 6 8 For example, in the nineteenth century, the prominent forms of fraud were embezzlement, false pretenses, forgery, and larceny by trick. 6 9 Each of these frauds was a crime against property. 70 Thus, even if the mail fraud statute's phrase "scheme . . . to defraud" proscribes all crimes encompassed by the generic term "fraud," it reaches only certain crimes against property.
It is, however, likely that the mail fraud statute uses the term "defraud" in a specific, rather than generic, sense. Indeed, the mail fraud statute should properly be interpreted as proscribing the fraud of false pretenses. The typical false-pretenses statute is al- During the period of enactment and critical amendment of the mail fraud statute, it was impossible to obtain a conviction for false pretenses unless the defendant had directly received something of economic value from the victim of the supposed fraudulent scheme. Moreover, those decisions permitting convictions for fraud although the victim had suffered no economic loss were not inconsistent with the general requirement that the victim transfer something of economic value to the defendant. 
The American Cases Involving Statutes Proscribing the Fraud of False Pretenses. In 1907, in the decision of In re Watermane
7 6 the Supreme Court of Nevada enunciated what had been an accepted principle of law for at least the preceding half century: "The obtaining and possession of something of value is an essential ingredient of the crime of obtaining money, goods or other property, under false pretenses, and where this essential ingredient is lacking, there is no crime. '7 7 Waterman involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which a man held in custody by Nevada authorities challenged the sufficiency of his indictment for false pretenses in Iowa, whose officials were seeking his extradition. The Nevada court carefully analyzed the formal indictment against Waterman, comparing it with the requirement of the Iowa false-pretenses statute. 78 The court found the indictment "fatally defective" because it failed to allege that Waterman had received anything of value from the victim in connection with the alleged scheme to defraud, and accordingly granted the writ. 9 Commonwealth v. Harkins" illustrates the lengths to which courts went in preserving the requirement that the defendant obtain some tangible thing of value. The defendant, by falsely asserting that he had sustained personal injuries for which the victim of the deception bore responsibility, obtained a consent judgment against the victim. The court ruled that the judgment could not serve as the basis for a conviction for false pretenses because the defendant had received money only after the order had been entered. The entry of the order marked the termination of the scheme and payment afterwards under the order was entirely lawful. 81 Some nineteenth-century courts permitted convictions for false pretenses although the victim suffered no economic loss. The farmer had obtained the machinery on credit by granting the merchant a mortgage on his crops and farm-a transaction to which the merchant agreed only after the farmer falsely represented that there were no liens on his property. Since the farmer had retained sufficient equity in the property to secure fully his debt to the merchant, the merchant was able to recover the machinery and sell it without any apparent loss. The court found that the lack of any economic loss to the merchant would not serve as a defense to swindling. 4 Rather, the court found that the crime is determined by "the value of the property the possession of which is so fraudulently acquired." 8 5 People v. Bryant 8 6 was a similar case. The defendant had sold to the victim a promissory note secured by a mortgage, but only after the defendant had falsely represented that the land covered by the mortgage was "good, tillable land, of good soil and of great value. '87 The accused argued in his defense that since the mortgage served only to secure the note, and since it had not been shown that the maker of the note would not fulfill his obligation, the "indictment fail [ed] LaMoyne and Bryant thus stand for the proposition that a conviction for the fraud of false pretenses can be sustained even when the victim has suffered no economic loss. 9 0 The cases do not signal, however, a departure from the requirement that something of economic value be obtained from the victim. In LaMoyne, the defendant acquired farm machinery from the victim; in Bryant, the money paid for the promissory note.
2. The English Case Law. In construing the English falsepretenses statute, 9 1 the English courts have consistently required that the defendant receive something of economic value from the victim.
9 2 For example, in Rex v. Wavell, e 3 the court held that the defendant could not be convicted for a scheme in which he acquired credit from a bank. Although the defendant's creditors had benefited from the transaction, the defendant had not received any money, chattel, or other item of value. The court ruled that the extension of credit alone did not, therefore, fall within the ambit of the statute.
'
Id. 95 the defendant received a credit on account for goods he knew to be defective. In affirming the conviction for attempting to obtain money under false pretenses, the court noted that the defendant had not yet received actual payment, and thus could not be convicted of the crime of obtaining something under false pretenses. 9 6 He, too, had received nothing of value from his victim.
Thus, the legislative history of the statute and the contemporaneous understanding of fraud indicate that the scheme or artifice to defraud is a scheme or artifice to trick the victim into transferring something of economic value to the defendant. When corrupt politicians deprive citizens of their intangible rights to honest government, there may be deception, but there is no transfer of anything of economic value 97 from the citizens to the politician. The meaning of fraud at the time the mail fraud statute was enacted and initially amended does not, therefore, support the intangiblerights theory.
III. SUPPORT FOR THE INTANGIBLE-RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN PRIOR FEDERAL CASE LAW
Although the legislative history of the statute and the nineteenth-century understanding of "fraud" fail to support the intangible-rights doctrine, decisions of the Supreme Court and of several courts of appeals have been cited as support for the doctrine. These cases have been misapplied, however, when offered as authority for the doctrine.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the money was received from the first bank. "A gross fraud has been committed, but not an obtaining money under false pretences within the statute." Id. at 241, 169 Eng. Rep. at 711. The prosecution of the defendant in this case resembles prosecutions for political corruption based on the intangible-rights theory in that an unlawful acquisition of money from one firm or person was used in an attempt to secure a conviction for defrauding a second firm or person, from whom no money was directly received. Lord Campbell did in fact condemn the original underlying conduct of the defendant in this case, but he clearly distinguished it from conduct that was within the reach of the statute. 1. Durland v. United States. As discussed above, the principal issue in Durland was whether the common-law defense of false promises might prevent a conviction under the mail fraud statute. 1 0 2 Under the majority rule at common law during the nineteenth century, a conviction for false pretenses could not be obtained on the basis of a false promise; a false representation had to refer to an existing or past fact to provide the basis for a conviction. 103 The Supreme Court held that this defense was not available in prosecutions under the mail fraud statute: "The statute is broader than is claimed. Its letter shows this: 'Any scheme or artifice to defraud.' Some schemes may be promoted through mere representations and promises as to the future, yet are none the less schemes and artifices to defraud."' 10 4
The Durland Court's reference to the breadth of the statute has led some lower courts to interpret Durland as eliminating all common-law principles of fraud in connection with section 1341.105
In so doing, these courts apparently disregard the fact that Durland eliminated a single common-law defense. The Court did not hold that all common-law principles of fraud were inapplicable to section 1341.106 Indeed, the Court was faced with no issue having a direct bearing on the intangible-rights doctrine. 10 7 Both after its ruling in the case and after the congressional codification of the ruling, the transfer of money or property was required in prosecutions under the statute. 0 8 2. Badders v. United States. Badders°9 has been cited as support for a broad reading of the statute in the political-corruption cases. 110 In United States v. Mandel, for example, the Fourth Circuit cited Badders dictum to support the proposition that section 1341 prohibits all forms of deception contrary to "accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play." ' Although the Supreme Court stated that section 1341's jurisdiction over misconduct accomplished through the mails provided a basis for Congress to proscribe anything contrary to public policy, the Court in Badders did not hold that Congress had done So. 111 The issue in that case was the constitutional question whether congressional power to regulate the mails necessarily included the power to punish certain conduct as criminal. The Court did not construe the concept of fraud in section 1341 broadly; rather, it construed broadly the constitutional power of Congress. Properly understood, the Badders dictum provides no support for the intangible-rights doctrine.
Supreme Court Interpretations of Fraud in Other Federal
Statutes. The other Supreme Court cases cited by the lower federal courts as support for the intangible-rights doctrine concern the meaning of fraud in various federal statutes. In intangiblerights cases under section 1341, the issue is whether a conviction is possible without the transfer of valuable property. In the cited cases, however, there had either been such a transfer or the conviction was not sustained. In Haas, the Court upheld an indictment charging the prisoner, who was seeking habeas corpus relief, with defrauding the government. 121 The Court noted that the statute reached conspiracies "to defraud the United States by depriving it of its lawful right . . . of promulgating or diffusing . . information . . . offi- The statement is merely a repetition of the common-law rule that pecuniary loss by the victim is unnecessary as long as the requirements of fraud have been met.
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The Isaacs court relied on the Supreme Court decision of Hammerschmidt v. United States by quoting the following passage: "It is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carrying out the governmental intention." 2 5 The Seventh Circuit did not explain how this statement supported the intangible-rights doctrine. " ' 2 6 The first clause of the quoted sentence merely repeats the common-law principles that the ictim of a fraud need not suffer economic loss.
The second clause of the quoted statement arguably supports the intangible-rights doctrine. The Court, it might be argued, used the words, "but only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by," to indicate that a transfer of something of economic value is unnecessary whenever the interference with official government action has resulted in a deprivation of rights. Such an argument is, however, untenable. There are two elements to fraud: deception and the transfer of an item of economic value. 2 The question before the Court, noted Chief Justice Taft, was "whether deceit or trickery was essential to satisfy the defrauding required under the statute,"' ' 28 and it was to that question that the quoted statement was undoubtedly addressed. Indeed, the con- cluding words of the second clause specify that the statute required only that official action be defeated by "misrepresentation, chicane or overreaching"-language plainly discussing the deception requirement. 12 9 Thus, the Supreme Court cases cited by the Seventh Circuit in Isaacs either fail to support or undercut the intangible-rights doctrine. Other courts, however, have attempted to support the doctrine with Supreme Court precedent. In United States v. States, 1 30 for instance, the federal district court cited two Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the intangible rights of citizens to representative government have economic value and that "[u]nder our form of government. . . it could hardly be contended that the right to have one's vote counted, undiluted by fraudulent absentee ballots, is without value." 13 1 The 
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edged to be constitutionally protected. 1 3 5 The cases do not support the proposition that intangible civil rights have economic value 1 S 6 -a proposition of dubious validity today l 7 and undoubtedly beyond the intentions of Congress in 1872, when the mail fraud statute was first enacted. The presentation of Supreme Court authority by the lower courts has been inapposite because these courts have ignored the explicit requirements for a finding of fraud. The central requirement-the transfer of something of economic value-has not been discarded by prior Supreme Court decisions.
B. Decisions of the Lower Federal Courts
The courts that have adopted the intangible-rights doctrine have relied 3 8 on the earlier decisions of two lower courts: Shushan v. United States, 13 9 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1941, and United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 140 decided by a district court in 1942. Careful analysis of these cases reveals, however, that although the defendants were charged with participation in schemes involving the breach of certain rights and duties, they also derived direct financial benefit from the victims of their frauds. These cases do not provide authority for the intangible-rights theory, under which there is no requirement that the defendant receive something of economic value from the victims of the fraud. In Shushan, the codefendants sought to obtain by fraud money from the parish fisc. Abraham Shushan, who had previously served on the Orleans Parish Levee Board, 1 42 conspired with a current Board member and three others in a scheme by which they obtained money deceptively from the Board through a plan to re-fund outstanding issues of its bonds. The defendants charged an exorbitant fee for the refunding service subsequently rendered; the fee was divided among the defendants according to a prearranged formula. 1 4 The Fifth Circuit noted that "all [of the defendants' conduct] was done and intended to obtain sums of money from the Board and taxpayers to be converted to [the defendants' own] use."' 14 This aspect of Shushan plainly provides no support for the intangible-rights doctrine.
Another part of the Shushan opinion-concerned with demonstrating the requisite element of deception-has, however, been cited as support for the intangible-rights doctrine. To strengthen its contention that the convictions did not rest solely on false representations or lies about the nature of the funding scheme, the court invoked a theory of fraud predicated on breach of fiduciary duty. 45 The one defendant sitting on the Board was bribed by the other defendants to persuade the Board to agree to the refunding scheme. The defendant Board member did so without revealing his own private interest in the matter. These actions by all the defendants resulted in a breach of their fiduciary duty to the Board and to the public. As the court stated, "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an one [sic] must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud.' 1 6 Separating the words from their context, the statement might seem to support the intangiblerights doctrine; accordingly, some courts have cited Shushan in support of the doctrine. 147 The context, however, demonstrates that the court was not addressing the question whether the defendants gained in the scheme; the court had already concluded that the economic requirement had been met. there is the implication that a scheme to gain personal favors from public officials is a scheme to defraud the public, although the interest lost by the public can be described no more concretely than an intangible right to the proper and honest administration of government"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974 148 Only a few lines earlier, the court noted that "[a] scheme to get money unfairly by obtaining and then betraying the confidence of another. . . would be a scheme to defraud though no lies were told." 117 F.2d at 115 (emphasis added).
establishing the proposition that breach of fiduciary duty is a kind of deception, and that when such a breach accounts for the acquisition of money-as it did here-the defendants have committed fraud.
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. 14 9 involved a prosecution under section 1341 in a nonpolitical setting. The corporate defendant had bribed employees of a competitor to obtain certain trade secrets of the competitor. The court explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that the proprietary information it illicitly obtained lacked monetary value. 1 0 Like the Fifth Circuit in Shushan, the court went on to consider whether the defendant had used deception, and, as in Shushan, the court's theory involved breach of fiduciary duty: "When one tampers with that relationship [between employer and employee] for the purpose of causing the employee to breach his duty he in effect is defrauding the employer of a lawful right." ' 51 Although Procter & Gamble has been cited as support for the intangible-rights doctrine by many of the recent political-corruption cases' 52 and by two recent Seventh Circuit cases adopting the doctrine in a corporate context, ' the Procter & Gamble court did not embrace any theory of intangible rights. Rather, the court held that something of economic valueproprietary information-had been taken from the defendant.
Procter & Gamble and Shushan establish no more than that (1974) . Both George and Bryza involved schemes in which a corporate purchasing agent received payments in connection with secret agreements with his employer's suppliers. The facts in each case do not clearly indicate whether there was a direct causal relationship between the defendant's receipt of the payments and his deception of the corporate victim-that is, whether the defendant received payment directly from corporate funds. The George court found this issue of causation irrelevant to its holding, id. at 512. Both courts, however, based their affirmation of the convictions squarely upon the intangible-rights doctrine, which was characterized as the deprivation from an employer of its employee's "loyal and honest services." Id. See Bryza, 522 F.2d at 422. Possibly the best interpretation of George and Bryza is that the Seventh Circuit simply used the intangible-rights doctrine to avoid the difficult problem of establishing, from complex and ambiguous facts, that the defendants had received direct economic benefit from the corporate victims of their deceptive schemes. To the extent that the court based such an approach on Procter & Gamble, it was without genuine authority for its holdings.
under some circumstances a breach of fiduciary duty amounts to the deception necessary for fraud. These early cases, to which the origin of the intangible-rights theory seems to have been traced by later courts, actually left the economic requirement of fraud intact.
CONCLUSION
By invoking a theory of intangible political rights, several federal courts have attempted to convert the federal mail fraud statute-section 1341-into a weapon for fighting political corruption when the citizenry has not been deprived of anything of economic value. The mere deprivation of the right to honest government, according to the intangible-rights theory, constitutes fraud for purposes of section 1341.
Analysis of the legislative history of section 1341, however, demonstrates that the section's reach should be limited to fraudulent conduct that results in the acquisition of money or property from the victim. The meaning of fraud in the nineteenth century, when the mail fraud statute was originally adopted, bolsters such a reading. Moreover, the Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions that have been cited for an intangible-rights construction of section 1341 do not provide support. The use of section 1341 against politically corrupt politicians thus remains contrary to Congress's original intent. Until Congress amends the section, such use should not receive the imprimatur of the courts.
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